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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

ROBERT J. OWENS,
Petitioner,

AMENDED ORDER ON
RESPONDENT'S OBJECTION TO
COMMISSIONER'S RULING
Civil No. 884900472
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CINDY LOU YOUNG (OWENS),

Judge William B. Bohling
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This matter came before the Court on August 26,2002, for a hearing on Respondent's Objection
to Commissioner's Ruling. Respondent was present and represented by her attorney, Delano S. Findlay.
Diana Obray appeared on behalf of the Estate of Robert J. Owens. After reading the written memoranda
submitted by both parties and after hearing oral argument from both parties, THE COURT DIRECTS
AND ORDERS THE FOLLOWING:
1.

The above-entitled cause of action shall be dismissed for Respondent's failure to comply

with Utah R. Civ. Pro. 25(a)(1).
2.

The above-entitled cause of action shall be dismissed because the claim did not survive
the death of the Petitioner*. Robert J. Owens.

DATED this Q
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, 2002
By the Court

Judge William H. Bohling
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SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH; MONDAY, AUGUST 26, 2 0 02, 9:15 A.M.
-oooOoooTHE COURT:

We're on the record in the matter of

Robert J. Owens, or the Estate of Robert J. Owens versus
Cindy Lou Owens, Case No. 884900472.
Counsel, would you enter your appearances, please.
MR. FINDLAY:

Delano Findlay for the movant or

respondent.
MS. OBRAY:

Diana Obray for the estate of Robert

THE COURT:

Thank you.

Owens.
I think these are your

objections, aren't they, Mr. Findlay?
MR. FINDLAY:

It is, Your Honor.

The Honorable Commissioner denied a motion to
substitute the estate for two reasons.

One, it hadn't been

substituted within 90 days and, two, as required by the rule
or specified by the rule -- and there's some -- some
exceptions to that.

And, number two, she held that the

case, or ruled that the case was moot and was terminated by
the death of the decedent, Mr. Owens.
She held that based on two cases, Prees
and Dailey

v.

Dailey.

v.

Prees

Both of those cases involved

situations where the decree was final after the death of the
party, and the court held that you can't, of course, divorce
someone who's dead.

3

In one case, I think the Prees case, the -- well,
in both cases, the Court had ruled in one case that the -the decree had been entered but not final for six months,
for some reason.
In the other case, the decree hadn't been entered.
The court had announced that it intended to and, before the
decree was entered, the party died unbeknownst to the court
and unbeknownst to the other party.

The attorney for the

other party went ahead and -- the plaintiff went ahead and
sought a -- got the decree -- went in for the default
judgment and the default judgment was entered.
the Prees case.

And that's

And in that case, the husband was killed in

a boating accident, fishing in Alaska, and the word didn't
arrive until after that.
But in both cases, the Court set those aside
saying, "You can't get a divorce from someone after they've
passed away and the action is mooted."
This is not that kind of a case, Your Honor.

This

is a case where a decree has been entered and had been in
effect for nearly 12 years -- or 12 years.
years.

It was entered in '89.

I guess about 12

He passed away in '91.

There had been a petition that he had filed to
modify the decree.

Ms. Young, now Mrs. Thompson, had filed

a counter-petition to modify the decree and increase child
support.

She'd had to hire a private detective to find

where he was working, because he told her he was unemployed.
They found him working at Kennecott.

There's been complaint

that that has not been resolved sooner.
As Your Honor knows, this has been a hotly
contested case.

We're here again on the case that Your

Honor's sat on a number of times.

And while it may tend to

become a little bit annoying to the Court and annoying to
the parties, still, there are issues there that are
important.

And the issues of back child support are what

should have been the child support because it was not
reported and it was not changed while he was alive.
Certainly, there's no reason why those don't
survive his death, again, and at least have to be settled by
his estate.

He left an estate of some kind behind, whatever

that is.
As Your Honor knows, there were motions on motions
and objections on objections all the way.

And you cannot

get a certification of trial in a domestic case if there are
motions outstanding that are unresolved.
During the two- to three-year period that this
case was not resolved, that the petition was not resolved,
that was the case.

If we look at the docket, we'll -- the

Court will see there may have been some brief periods of
time there, very brief, between motions or -- but when those
motions were filed, they had to be -- they had to be faced.

5

They had to be reconciled and disposed of.

And there were

objections, always objections, just as there was at the
trial that Your Honor had back in 1997.

I think it took

until a year later, June of '98, to resolve the objections
because of the objections that were filed to the Court's
orders and to the filings.
That's been the case here.

This isn't a case

that's appropriate for dismissal for failure to prosecute.
And, in fact, it's been prosecuted maybe a little too much.
But I don't know how you solve that, where you have the
problems that we've had in this case.
I'd just refer Your Honor to Comm. Arnett's review
before he recused himself of the entire file, from the
beginning to the end, and his comments that he made in the
minute entry of -- well, it was filed on February the 24th,
2 000, in which he -- he made some comments with regard to
the litigiousness and the obstreperous nature and the
incredible nature of the petitioner at that time.
The cases that I've talked with Your Honor about
are clearly widely distinctual.

And there are some cases

that are opposite that allow the Court - - o r that show that
the Court has considered issues in family relations cases
after the death of one of the decedents.

This one is child

support; nevertheless, it is child support that was based
upon his earnings.

There's a record of his earnings,

there's a record of Ms. Young's earnings.
brought forward.
determined.

Those can be

The child support can easily be

Whether or not there's enough in the estate to

recover is another question, but it ought to be resolved on
that basis, Your Honor.
The other issue is the issue of whether the
failure to substitute the party within 90 days is fatal.
The cases that are cited by the petitioner do not deal with
the issue of where such a thing happened, but I would like
to refer the Court to the Federal Rules, because the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure are nearly a carbon copy of the
Federal Rules.

And as Your Honor knows, we look to the

Federal Rules in Utah to construe our own rules because it
doesn't mean they're controlling in all cases, but it does
mean that they have a very -- that they are weighty.
And I've cited a case in my objection that is a
Federal Rules case.

If I may have a moment, Your Honor.

I

might be able to find the case faster.
Out of the Second Circuit.
mean to say Seventh.

is Continental

Bank,

Did I say Second?

Out of the Seventh Circuit.

N.A. , v. Andrew C. Meyer,

and it's at 10 3d 1293.

Jr.,

I

The case

at al. ,

And in that case, the Court of

Appeals for the Tenth Circuit -- and I don't have a page
number of that - - o f the citation in the case because I got
this out of Versus Law and it doesn't give us the page

1

numbers.
But the court said, "While couched in mandatory

2
3

terms, the advisory committee notes to Rule 2 5 indicate that

4

the 9 0-day requirement may be extended by Federal Rule of

5

Civil Procedure 6(b) and 6(b)(2).

6

"The District Court, for the cause -- for cause shown may,

7

at any time in its discretion upon the motion made after the

8

expiration of the specified time period, permit the act to

9

be done or the failure to act as a result of excusable

10

Rule 6(b)(2) states that:

neglect."
And then it talks about the history of Rule 25(a)

11
12

and Rule 6(b) "makes it clear that the 90-day time period

13

was not intended to act as a bar to otherwise meritorious

14

actions and the extensions of the period of time may be

15

liberally granted."
And they then quote another case.

16

In that case,

17

they quote Tatterson -- that's two T's -- Tatterson

18

Coppers

19

Decisions Frd. 19.

20

Pennsylvania, 1984.

21

v.

-- and that's two P's -- Company, 104 5th Rules of
And that's Western District of

Your Honor, we believe this case is very

22

meritorious.

The failure to pay the amount of child support

23

that should have been paid and to report the proper amount

24

of child support and employment was egregious.

25

great efforts by Ms. Young then, now Mrs. Thompson, to find

It took

1

out where Mr. Owens was working.

And we had to subpoena his

2

records from Kennecott Copper to find out what his income

3

was.

4

acrimony at the time, for whatever the reason or whatever

5

the purpose.

6

Mrs. Owens -- Mrs. Thompson has been effectively cheated out

7

of several thousand dollars of child support that she had to

8

forego, the children had to forego while they were living.

9

This is not ongoing child support we're talking about, it's

They weren't voluntarily given.

There was a lot of

That wasn't able to be brought forth, and

child support in the past.

10

The substitution didn't occur sooner because

11
12

Mr. Owens made a will 15 days before he passed away and

13

named, as the executor or executrix of the will, the

14

personal representative, his -- his female companion, Kathy

15

Lee Seech.

16

She concluded that it was a small estate; she would not file

17

to settle it.

18 I
19

She did not file and did not intend to file.

Ms. Young had to eventually -- Mrs. Thompson had
to eventually file on behalf of her minor child, as the

20 I guardian for her minor child, and apply to become the -- the

21 | legal - - o r the personal representative in order to get
22 I bring the issue to a head.

And as soon -- within ten days

23

after deployment of a personal representative, which is

24

Ms. Seech, in March, we filed a motion to substitute.

25

Now, some of the cases may say that you can always

file a motion even though it hasn't run, or seek an

1
2

extension of time.

That may well be the case.

I don't know

3

the difference between filing a motion and having it sit

4

there and wait till it can properly be resolved and heard

5

from filing the motion.

6

that that's excusable neglect and it's for good cause.

7

the case could have been brought within the 90 days had

8

there been cooperation with the estate.

And I would submit, Your Honor,
But

Now that the estate -- it hasn't been brought, the

9
10

estate is asserting that as a defense -- I think they ought

11

to be estopped.

12

based on that.

13

it won't take a lot of time, a small evidentiary hearing,

14

It's not a momentous matter to determine and

I hearing what the child support should have been.
I'll submit that, Your Honor.

15
16
17

I think that the Court ought to grant it

I

18 I

THE COURT:

All right.

Counsel?

MS. OBRAY:

Thank you, Your Honor.

Comm. Bradford sought to dismiss this case and we

19

would ask this Court to do the same, as well as award the

20

estate attorneys fees and costs.

21

dismissing this case, and the first is a failure to

22

prosecute under Rule 41.

23

substitute the estate as a party according to Rule 25.

24

the third is a failure to state a claim upon which relief

There are three bases for

The second is a failure to
And

25 I can be granted, under Rule 12(b)(6).

10

The underlying issue in this case is a petition to

1
2

modify a divorce decree that was filed in 1998.

And there

3

was nothing done on that case until, you know, just

4

recently, after the death of Mr. Owens on August 2 9th of

5

2001.
And Rule 41 requires that a person bringing a case

6
7

prosecute that case diligently, and that was not done here.

8

Here it is, four years later, and they're still trying to

9

resolve this issue.

Mr. Owens has now died, he has no

10

opportunity to defend himself or present evidence on his

11

behalf.

12

the length of time between the filing of -- between the

13

filing of this case and the pursuance by the respondent, the

14

respondent's failed to prosecute under Rule 41, and this

15

case should be dismissed.

And just because of

The second basis is a failure to substitute the

16
17

He's been dead almost a year.

estate as a party under Rule 25.

Rule 25 requires, at the

18 | death of a party or the -- it required the respondent in
19 | this case to substitute the estate as a party, which was not
20 I done.

21
22
23
24
25

In our memorandum in support, we mention that we
actually received copies of a -- a motion to -- for an
extension of time, a motion to substitute, but those were
apparently never filed by Mr. Findlay.
Robert Owens' previous attorney, Ephraim

11

Fankhauser, filed a notice of death one week after Mr. Owens
died and served that Notice of Death on the court and on all
relevant parties.

Mr. Findlay had 90 days to either

substitute the estate as a party or to move for an
extension, and he did not do so.

And there was no

cooperation required by the estate; all he had to do is move
to substitute a party, which he did not do.

And the rule

requires that the case be dismissed if that was not done.
And we need to look no further than the Civil Rules of
Procedure, Utah Civil Rules of Procedure.
And the third basis for dismissal is that this
case states no claim on which relief may be granted.
Mr. Owens has been dead now for almost a year and, at his
death, the action terminated.

There are some actions that

survive the death of a party, but this is not -- there's no
case law or rules or statutes to support the notion that
this type of action survives the death of a party.
And in his objection, Mr. Findlay cites a couple
of cases as support for what -- for this motion, for the
objection that he files today.
point.

And those cases are not on

The first -- are not on point.
The first case is the In re:

has been overruled by Dailey

v.

Dailey,

Harper

Estate,

and Dailey

which
v.

Dailey

was used by Comm. Bradford in dismissing this case in the
first go round.

12
I

And another case he refers to is Columbo

1

v.

2

Columbo.

3

the child support obligation of the deceased father.

4

they -- and finding persuasive in that case, they found that

5

the deceased father had left his child a life insurance

6

policy, that the child's mother was receiving social

7

security survivorship benefits, and also that the father had

8

died.

9

of circumstances which warranted the dismissal of any

And in that case, the court actually eliminated
And

And the court considered those all material changes

10

further child support obligation on the part of the father.

11

And we have exactly similar facts here.

12

is dead and he's been dead now for almost a year.

13

his son a $30,000 life insurance policy.

14

now receiving more than $1,000 a month in social security

Mr. Owens
He left

Cindy Thompson is

15 benefits, as opposed to the $200-some-odd a month that
16

Robert Owens was paying in life.

And so the cases

17 Mr. Findlay cites in his objection are not on point.
18

And since there is no support for continuation of

19

this action, we would ask the Court to dismiss this case,

20

because the action terminated upon Mr. Owens' death.

21

the estate has had to incur considerable time and expense in

22

defending these motions, and we would ask the Court for an

23

award of attorneys fees and costs.

24
25

MR. FINDLAY:

And

Thank you.

If I may, briefly, Your Honor.

There are about six pages in the docket since the filing of

13

this petition or counter-petition to modify based on
increased child support.
prosecuted.

This case has not failed to be

It has been very prosecuted.

This is not at

all a case where the case has just sat there.
THE COURT:

We have --

Did the six pages all deal with the

modification or were there other issues that were -MR. FINDLAY:

No.

There were other issues that

kept us from getting the modification.

There were motion

after motion filed by Mr. Owens for custody, for medical
expenses and for other objections.

Ms. Young filed one

motion, as I recall, a counter-motion on one
for medical expenses.

of his motions

She made one objection.

Every order

that the court made in this case was objected to by
Mr. Fankhauser ad infinitum, and even a motion to recuse the
commissioner, Comm. Arnett, because of his expression of
what he felt was lack of credibility by Mr. Owens.

These

things all took place during this period of time.
Your Honor's also well aware that we had to -- to
garnish Mr. Owens' wages to get the child support, the
judgment that Your Honor issued.
happened.

All of those things

And as I have mentioned, we cannot certify the

case ready for trial until the motions outstanding are
resolved.
The form -- there is a form that is required for
certification for domestic case that has two pages of listed

14

items.

And it's -- I've never been able to get a case

certified ready for trial if a motion wasn't concluded.
And Your Honor can note by looking at the docket
that it wasn't a great period of time between the time of
the last motion once there are the objections to the order
on the last motion where it concluded and the -- and the
death of the petitioner.

That alone, I think, is nothing

like the case they cite, which is -- well, it's
Manor,

I believe.

I won't go find it.

Countryside

It's in their

record.
As to the two cases that they talk about -- and
let me say this first.

Mr. Owens' attorney, Mr. Fankhauser,

and though he didn't do it under those terms, did - - o r did
file something.

He filed what was called a Termination of

Jurisdiction, or a Notice of Termination of Jurisdiction.
responded to it.

I

I filed a response and said no, the

court's jurisdiction isn't terminated; the Court has
jurisdiction of the estate of the decedent.
And as I explained in my argument we took all of
that time trying to get a personal representative appointed
before one could be substituted or before the Court could
decide whether to substitute.

The Court would not, of

course, have substituted the estate without the appointment
of a personal representative.

I think that's very good

cause, and I think it's excusable neglect.

15

In re:

1

Harper's

Estate,

it's interesting.

They

2

say it was overruled.

And there's some talk in the opinion

3

by Judge - - o r Justice Crocket that they overruled it.

4

he was talking, in that sense, in dissent.

5

Estate

was not overruled by Prees

6

Estate

-- well, the issue in Harper's Estate that we're

7

talking about wasn't overruled.

8

she mentions doesn't apply because they -- they did not

9

grant the child support.

Harper's

In fact

or Bailey.

But

Harper's

And the Columbo v. Columbo

That has nothing to do with

10

whether they considered the issue or not.

They fully

11

considered the issue after the death of a party, and they

12

decided not to grant child support on other bases.

13

basis was that he had an insurance policy.

14

ongoing child support.

And the

And that was

It doesn't apply here.

Ms. Young is getting ongoing child support.

15
16

Fortunately, for the first time in her life, she's getting

17

child support based on the social security that's paid,

18

after Mr. Owens' death, without having to go to court to

19

force it.

20

gotten child support without having to go to Court to force

21

it.

22

The first time since the decree -- has she ever

In this particular case, she's seeking child

23

support she shouldn't have gotten -- or she should have

24

gotten, child support she was cheated out of, child support

25 Ithat is passed, against the estate.

And I believe that

16

1

that's -- CoIujnJbo doesn't -- doesn't - - i s not applicable,

2

it doesn't hold against that at all.

3

you can consider a domestic dispute after the death of one

4

of the parties where there has been a child support - - o r

5

has been a decree.

6

In fact, it holds that

That is what they did.

The same thing happened in Harper's

Estate,

7

whether they claim it's overruled or not.

They did consider

8

it and they found a way around it.

9

problem of the death, but they found a way around it and

They talked about the

10

still awarded the -- well, they found a way around it

11

because they said the ethic tool -- they used the equity

12

powers of the court not to award the -- the surviving spouse

13

the estate because of other reasons.

14

The policy that is for Ms. Owens' —

or

15 Mrs. Thompson's son Jacob has nothing to do with paying her
16

back child support.

17

reach it without legal process.

18

going on that basis, but that's because Mr. Owens also

19

failed to have a policy of insurance which the decree

20

ordered him to have.

21

It might be reachable, but she can't
There's some legal process

Your Honor, there is every reason for the Court to

22

exercise its discretion and equity and -- and grant the

23

motion to -- to appoint personal representative.

24

there -- I don't believe there's any reason at all -- I

25

don't believe the cases cited at all require dismissal of

And

17

1

this action.

Thank you.

2

THE COURT:

Thank you, Mr. Findlay.

3

Having heard the arguments of counsel and having

4

had the opportunity to review the memoranda of the parties,

5

it's the Court's decision to sustain the recommendation of

6

Comm. Bradford and dismiss this matter.

7

arguable whether or not there was a failure to prosecute

8

this claim.

9

and there's been little action done on the modification,

I think it's

Certainly, it has been pending for a long time

10

although there have been a number of other matters that have

11

taken this Court's time.
The Court doesn't have a recollection that it was

12
13

all one-sided.

14

contentious a divorce case as the Court has -- has ever had

15

the opportunity to deal with, and I think it came from both

16

sides.

17

It seemed to be it was -- it's as

It's clear to this Court that Rule 25 does

18

require, and appropriately would require, that this matter

19

be dismissed, and also the Court is unpersuaded by the

20

respondent's cases, believes a far better law interpretation

21

of the cases is -- is defined, that the matter does not

22

survive the death of the - - o f the petitioner in this case.

23

For all those reasons, the Court is entering its

24

decision, is going to request that the petitioner prepare an

25

order consistent with my ruling.

And I decline to enter an

«, award of attorneys fees.
2

It seems to me that the basis for

which -- and the failure to do so is not met in this case.

3 I And for those reasons, the Court decides as it does.
4

Thank you.

5

MS. OBRAY:

Thank you, Your Honor.

6

THE COURT:

We'll be in recess.

7
8
9

(Whereupon, at 9:40 a.m., the hearing
was concluded.)
-oooOooo-

10
11
12
13
14
15
6
7

19

C E R T I F I C A T E

STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

}
}
j

ss,

I, JERI KEARBEY, a Certified Court Transcriber inand for the State of Utah, do h e r e b y certify that the foregoing
electronically-recorded proceedings were transcribed by me from tapes
furnished by t h e Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake
County, State of Utah;
That pages 1 t h r o u g h

19, both inclusive, r e p r e s e n t

a full, t r u e , and correct t r a n s c r i p t of the testimony given and the
proceedings had on

August 26, 2002

, and that said t r a n s c r i p t

contains all of t h e evidence, all of the objections of counsel and rulings
of the Court, and all matters to which t h e same relate,
DATED this

26th

day of March 2003.

f^Vvljbib
JERI KEARBEY, CCT

I hereby affirm that the foregoing transcript was
prepared u n d e r my supervision and direction.

Peggy

TSffiev,
<3£&ter,

v

CSR,RPR/Notary

20

